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Abstract
Previous research indicates that conspiracy thinking is informed by the psy-
chological imposition of order and meaning on the environment, including
the perception of causal relations between random events. Four studies
indicate that conspiracy belief is driven by readiness to draw implausible
causal connections even when events are not random, but instead conform
to an objective pattern. Study 1 (N = 195) showed that conspiracy belief
was related to the causal interpretation of real-life, spurious correlations
(e.g., between chocolate consumption and Nobel prizes). In Study 2
(N = 216), this effect held adjusting for correlates including magical and
non-analytical thinking. Study 3 (N = 214) showed that preference for
conspiracy explanations was associated with the perception that a focal
event (e.g., the death of a journalist) was causally connected to similar,
recent events. Study 4 (N = 211) showed that conspiracy explanations for
human tragedies were favored when they comprised part of a cluster of
similar events (vs. occurring in isolation); crucially, they were indepen-
dently increased by a manipulation of causal perception. We discuss the
implications of these findings for previous, mixed findings in the literature
and for the relation between conspiracy thinking and other cognitive pro-
cesses.
In January 2012, the Argentinian President Christina
Fernandez de Kirchner was diagnosed with cancer.
Speaking the day after her diagnosis, Hugo Chavez,
then President of Venezuela, noted that several other
leftist Latin American leaders had also recently been
afflicted by cancer, including the President of Paraguay
(Fernando Lugo), the President (Dilma Rousseff) and
former President (Lula de Silva) of Brazil, not to men-
tion Chavez himself (who was later to die of the
disease, while de Kirchner turned out to be misdiag-
nosed). He then suggested that this co-occurrence was
“difficult to explain using the laws of probabilities.” In
place of these laws, he implicated the United States.
“Would it be strange,” Chavez asked in a televised
speech, “if they had developed the technology to
induce cancer and nobody knew about it?” (Alexander,
2012).
This anecdote illustrates several important features
of conspiracy theorizing, which may be defined as the
attribution of events to the secret actions of powerful
and malevolent groups (Douglas, Sutton, & Cichocka,
2017). For example, conspiracy thinking may take the
form of suspicion and oblique questioning rather than
direct accusation (Wood, 2017). Also, conspiracy theo-
rizing serves political purposes, casting rival nations,
factions, and social outgroups as devious and malign
and ingroup members as their victims (Cichocka,
Marchlewska, Golec de Zavala, & Olechowski, 2016;
Imhoff & Bruder, 2014; Uscinski & Parent, 2014).
Of most interest to the present article, Chavez’s con-
spiratorial musings appealed explicitly to an apparent
pattern in events. In so doing, they conform to the
theory that conspiracy thinking is linked to the moti-
vated perception of order and meaning in the environ-
ment (Marchlewska, Cichocka, and Kossowska, 2017;
Quinby, 1999; Van Prooijen & Jostmann, 2013; van
Prooijen, Douglas, & De Inocencio, 2018; Whitson,
Galinsky, & Kay, 2015; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008).
Crucially, Chavez did not stop by observing the pattern:
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He explicitly rejected the idea that it could be explained
as a coincidence and implied that the events were cau-
sally connected—despite the causal connection being
vague and implausible. Building on recent research, we
propose that this tendency to draw implausible causal
connections between events is a crucial driver of con-
spiracy thinking. Further, we propose that this ten-
dency is important not only when events are random,
but also when they co-occur systematically or conform
to some objective pattern. We report four studies to test
this hypothesis and discuss its implications for theories
of conspiracy thinking.
Conspiracy Thinking and Perceiving Pattern and
Causality in Random Events
Scholars have argued that conspiracy beliefs are moti-
vated by the desire to explain and find order and
meaning in events that might otherwise seem random,
unpredictable, or outside of one’s control (Goertzel,
1994). Although early research did not test this idea
directly, several findings provided indirect support for
it. For example, conspiracy beliefs were found to be
more prevalent among disadvantaged groups, who
presumably have a stronger need to explain events
beyond their control (e.g., Crocker, Luhtanen, Broad-
nax, & Blaine, 1999; Goertzel, 1994; Thorburn & Bog-
art, 2005). Other findings indicated that individuals
are more likely to endorse conspiracy beliefs if they
are dispositionally high in need of compensatory con-
trol, including alienated and powerless individuals
(e.g., Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig, & Gregory,
1999). In a direct test of this idea, Whitson and Galin-
sky (2008) found that participants who were experi-
mentally made to feel powerless were more inclined to
perceive patterns (identifiable shapes such as animals
and buildings) in visual stimuli and were also more
inclined to endorse conspiracy theories.
Whitson and Galinsky’s (2008) results suggest that
there is a relationship between conspiracy belief and
the perception of patterns. Both are the products of an
underlying motivation to restore control by imposing
meaning on the environment. As Whitson and Galin-
sky put it (see also Dieguez, Wagner-Egger, & Gauvrit,
2015), conspiracy theories can be seen as the “identifi-
cation of a coherent and meaningful interrelationship
among a set of random or unrelated stimuli” (p. 115).
However, Whitson and Galinsky (2008) examined the
correlation between the perception of visual patterns
and conspiracy belief only indirectly, by showing that
they were both increased by a lack of control.
Visual pattern perception is one means of imposing
order on random stimuli. A related mechanism
involves perceiving patterns in event sequences. People
tend to be surprised by how often random processes
throw up results that look ordered, for example long
streaks of heads or tails in coin tosses. In principle, peo-
ple may notice these co-occurrences without assuming
that the events are causally connected—for example,
they perceive the co-occurrence as a random coinci-
dence. In practice, however, people appear to find it
hard to resist attributing co-occurrences to a proximal
causal mechanism, rather than to chance (e.g., Braga,
Mata, Ferreira, & Sherman, 2016; Caruso, Waytz, &
Epley, 2010). As van Prooijen et al. (2018), p. 321
wrote:
Illusory pattern perception emerges because people
often have difficulty recognizing when stimuli do or
do not occur through a random process. . . Put differ-
ently, a random process often generates sequences
that appear non-random to the human mind, and
that may even contain occasional symmetries or aes-
thetic regularities. As a result, it is difficult for people
to appreciate the role of coincidence in generating
these pattern-like sequences.
This reasoning suggests that causal inferences are a
crucial part of judgments that random events comprise
patterns. The first empirical test of the perception of
pattern in random events was conducted by Dieguez
et al. (2015), who examined the correlation between
perceptions of pattern (vs. randomness) specifically in
event sequences. Like Blackmore and Troscianko
(1985), they devised a measure of perceptions of non-
randomness in strings of Xs and Os. Across three stud-
ies, they found that perceptions of non-randomness
(i.e., that events were causally determined rather than
random) were unrelated to established measures of
conspiracy belief. In contrast, van Prooijen et al. (2018)
found that conspiracy beliefs were related to measures
of pattern perception including perceptions of non-ran-
domness (causal determination) in coin tosses and in
world events. They also found that instructing partici-
pants to search for patterns in random strings of coin
tosses increased pattern perception, which in turn was
associated with increased conspiracy belief.
Conspiracy Thinking and Perceiving Causality in
Non-random Events
The different results obtained by Dieguez et al. (2015)
and van Prooijen et al. (2018) indicate the need for
further research to clarify the conditions under which
conspiracy thinking is related to pattern perception.
Both sets of studies also leave an important question
open: Namely, whether conspiracy thinking is related
to faulty causal perceptions even in situations where
events are not truly random. These studies were
grounded in the theory that conspiracy belief is a form
of pattern perception in which causal understandings
are imposed on essentially random or at least under-
determined events to make them seem more ordered.
Put differently, causal inferences are a way of impos-
ing an arbitrary but psychologically meaningful order
on randomness. In these studies, participants have, for
the most part, been presented with random event
sequences. In such situations, perceiving patterns is
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only possible when observers are willing to draw
implausible and unwarranted causal connections
between events which, by definition, are causally
unconnected.
This unanswered question is important, because typ-
ically, the events at issue in conspiracy theories are
not random. For example, the deaths of John F. Ken-
nedy, Princess Diana, and Osama Bin Laden were not
random occurrences. Each death can be seen as the
outcome of a multitude of personal, social, and politi-
cal causes (e.g., in the case of Princess Diana, including
a celebrity culture that fueled the reckless actions of
paparazzi, the fact that the driver had been drinking,
and the lack of guard rails on the concrete columns in
the tunnel where the fatal crash occurred). Each
death, indeed, has an official causal explanation that is
challenged by conspiracy theories. More generally,
events in human life are typically somewhat struc-
tured and are over- rather than under-determined—
that is, each event has multiple causes (Mill, 1973).
This is why the explanatory dilemma typically posed
by socially significant events is not whether something
caused them, but rather what caused them (Kelley,
1967). To paraphrase the apt metaphor for causal
inference—“connecting the dots”—put forward by van
Prooijen et al. (2018), the issue when events are non-
random may be whether observers connect the wrong
dots, rather than any dots whatsoever.
To be sure, conspiracy thinking appears to thrive
under conditions of causal uncertainty; that is, when
people have incomplete, second hand, conflicting, or
ambiguous causal information (Douglas & Sutton,
2011; Kovic & F€uchslin, 2018; Newheiser, Farias, &
Tausch, 2011). The true (ontological) rather than
merely apparent (epistemic) random stimuli of exist-
ing studies (Dieguez et al., 2015; van Prooijen et al.,
2018) can be viewed as a simulation of these condi-
tions of causal uncertainty. Crucially therefore, it
appears reasonable to infer that faulty perceptions that
events are causally connected should be important to
conspiracy theories even when there is some objective
structure to events. However, non-random situations
are different, in that perceptible patterns in events
may exist independently of any causal inference by
the observer. Further, these patterns, notably co-
occurrences, may affect causal reasoning processes and
disrupt their relation to conspiracy thinking. The
external validity of research on conspiracy thinking
will benefit from developing and testing the hypothe-
sis that it depends on the faulty perception of causal
connections between events, whether those events are
random or non-random.
Lessons from the Literature on Co-occurrence
and Causal Inference
Previous research has shown that causal inference and
the perception of co-occurrence in events are strongly
related. Causal inference can affect the perceptual
organization of events: Since Heider (1958), psycholo-
gists have seen causal inference as a means of impos-
ing order on the environment, and organizing
multiple stimuli into coherent units or Gestalts (Read,
Vanman, & Miller, 1997; Xu, Tang, Zhou, Shen, &
Gao, 2017). Conversely, causal inference is strongly
influenced by the perception of at least two kinds of
regularity. First, for one event to be seen as the cause
of another, the two events should normally be seen to
be correlated. That is, if one tends to be present, then
the other is present, and if it tends to be absent, then
the other is absent. This is known as the covariation
principle (e.g., Kelley, 1967; Sutton & McClure, 2001).
Second, in addition to correlation, temporal contiguity
is important. People are more likely to perceive events
as causally connected if they occur close together in
time (Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Buehner, 2005).
Nonetheless, the perception and causal interpretation
of co-occurrences are conceptually and empirically sep-
arable. Whether people infer causality from a correla-
tion depends on whether they harbor a tacit theory
that the putative cause has the power to affect the
putative outcome (Cheng, 1997; Cheng & Lu, 2017).
Thus, people prefer to explain large outcomes in
terms of large effects, and small outcomes in terms of
small effects (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986; Spina et al.,
2010; see also Van Prooijen & Van Dijk, 2014).
Indeed, people will override the covariation principle
if they have specific information about causal mecha-
nisms. For example, even if a driver has had no
accidents before, observers tend to see her as the pri-
mary cause of an accident if they know she was
short-sighted and not wearing corrective lenses (Ahn
& Bailenson, 1996). Likewise, even if intentional
actions (e.g., lighting a campfire) covary equally or
less strongly with an outcome (e.g., a forest fire), peo-
ple prefer to natural causes (e.g., a drought) as expla-
nations over natural events (e.g., McClure, Hilton, &
Sutton, 2007).
This means that variations in the willingness to per-
ceive causal relationships between variables may be
important even in the presence of objective co-occur-
rences. A relevant individual difference variable is
magical thinking (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983), which
captures the “belief, quasi-belief, or . . . semi-serious
entertainment of the possibility that events which,
according to the causal concepts of this culture, cannot
have a causal relation to each other, might somehow
nevertheless do so” (Meehl, 1973, p. 54). Although
magical thinking is discouraged by modern industrial-
ized societies, it persists, often co-existing with cultur-
ally mandated, quasi-scientific conceptions of causality
(Legare, Evans, Rosengren, & Harris, 2012). Magical
thinkers are more willing than others to ascribe causal
powers to stimuli, for example entertaining the possi-
bility that stepping on cracks on a pavement may bring
bad luck, or that misfortunes (e.g., a freak electrocu-
tion) may be brought about by objectively unrelated
bad deeds (e.g., infidelity; for a review see Callan, Sut-
ton, Harvey, & Dawtry, 2014). Crucially, magical
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thinkers are also more inclined to endorse conspiracy
theories (Darwin, Neave, & Holmes, 2011; Douglas,
Sutton, Callan, Dawtry, & Harvey, 2016; Lobato, Men-
doza, Sims, & Chin, 2014).
In sum, we propose that the willingness to draw
implausible connections between events, even when
events co-occur non-randomly, underpins conspiracy
thinking. Put differently, we expect that the effect of
faulty causal inferences demonstrated by van Prooijen
et al. (2018) generalizes to situations in which events
are non-random. Whether events are truly random or
not, conspiracy thinking reflects a “psychological need
to explain events” (Newheiser et al., 2011, p. 1007),
and may be sustained by willingness to impose
implausible causal narratives on event sequences.
The Present Research
In the present studies, we examined whether conspir-
acy beliefs are related to perceptions of causal connec-
tion between events—whether or not events co-occur.
The key strategy of these studies is to present partici-
pants with sequences of events that have some objec-
tive structure, but where the causal mechanisms for
that structure are unspecified. Studies 1 and 2 tested
the relationship between conspiracy belief and causal
interpretation of one previously unstudied type of co-
occurrence: spurious correlations. Participants read
about documented (real-life) spurious correlations
(e.g., between chocolate consumption and Nobel
Prizes) and indicated whether those correlations reflect
a direct causal connection between the spurious corre-
lates. Studies 3 and 4 tested the relationship between
conspiracy belief and causal interpretation of another
type of co-occurrence: streaks or coincidences in which
a rash of similar events occur closely together in time.
Study 3 investigated whether people prefer conspiracy
explanations for a recent human tragedy (e.g., the
death of a journalist), if they see it as not only forming
a co-occurrence together with similar recent tragedies,
but causally connected to them. In an experimental
design, Study 4 presented human tragedies as either
isolated or part of a streak of three or four similar cases,
and independently as causally connected (vs. uncon-
nected). It therefore examined whether perceiving
events as causally connected affects conspiracy think-
ing independently of the presence of an objective co-
occurrence in those events. All materials and data can
be viewed at: https://osf.io/m2g4x.
Study 1
One of the most familiar catch cries for students in
psychology and other empirical disciplines is that cor-
relation does not entail causation. Getting students to
understand and apply the principle is a crucial aim in
their training in critical thinking (Halpern, 1998; Wil-
son, Aronson, & Carlsmith, 2010). As we have seen,
meeting this aim confronts an obstacle in that human
judgments of causation are heavily influenced by per-
ceptions of correlation (Cheng, 1997; Heider, 1958;
Kelley, 1967). However, to our knowledge there is lit-
tle or no research examining people’s (in)ability to
judge that verbally described correlations between two
variables may not signify a causal relationship (but for
relevant research on contingency learning over multi-
ple trials, see Fiedler, Walther, Freytag, & Nickel,
2003). Neither has any research examined the corre-
lates of this (in)ability.
In this study, we aimed to investigate whether cau-
sal interpretations of correlations are associated with
conspiracy beliefs, in accordance with our proposal
that conspiracy thinking is fostered by readiness to
impose implausible causal interpretations on events in
the environment. In particular, we examined the rela-
tionship between conspiracy beliefs and causal inter-
pretation of spurious correlations—those that are
produced by the operation of third causes. For stimuli,
we exploited Vigen’s (2015) compilation of real-life
but spurious and indeed often entertainingly absurd
correlations, mined from publicly available datasets.
These include relations between per capita chocolate
consumption and Nobel Prizes, and between drown-
ings in American swimming pools and power gener-
ated by US nuclear power plants. We presented six
spurious correlations to participants and asked if they
could be explained in terms of a causal relationship
between the two variables, versus chance alone, or the
operation of a third cause. We also measured the
extent to which participants endorsed conspiracy theo-
ries about a separate set of well-known events such as
the NASA moon landings and the deaths of Princess
Diana and John F. Kennedy.
Importantly, these spurious correlations involving
events conform to an objective pattern. Since Vigen’s
(2015) correlations refer to statistically significant rela-
tions over time, they are by definition unlikely to be
attributable to chance. Therefore, the critical issue is
not whether some causal force, but rather what causal
force is responsible for these non-random correlations.
Of course, the correlations are spurious because there
is no plausible direct causal connection between the
two variables: For example, it is (unfortunately!) diffi-
cult to argue that eating chocolate is of direct benefit
to a country’s scientific research. Thus, just as the per-
ception of patterns in random event sequences depends
on the imposition of implausible connections between
events (van Prooijen et al., 2018), so does the infer-
ence that direct causal relations exist between spurious
correlates. Since our proposal is that conspiracy think-
ing depends on the imposition of implausible causal
connections between events, we therefore predicted
that the perception of direct causal connections
between spurious correlates would be associated with
conspiracy belief. We asked participants whether they
thought the events might be associated due to chance
but also to the influence of a third cause, which is itself
a causal interpretation of the events. Since neither of
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these inferences involves an implausible imposition of
causality, we did not expect them to be associated with
conspiracy thinking.
Method
Participants and design. A sample of 200 partici-
pants was recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
(MTurk). Five participants indicated that their data
should not be used, and were deleted for further
analyses (i.e., answered “No” to the question, “In
your honest opinion, should we use your data in our
analyses in this study?”). The final sample consisted
of 195 participants (94 men, 101 women) between
the ages of 18 and 74 (M = 36.32, SD = 11.38). The
study had a correlational design. The sample size
allowed us to estimate stable correlation coefficients
(Sch€onbrodt & Perugini, 2013) and provided us with
80% power to detect a correlation of r = .20 with
a = .05 and a two-tailed test.
Materials and procedure. After giving informed
consent, participants were instructed that they would
receive several questionnaires tapping into people’s
attitudes toward real life issues and their causal rea-
soning. Participants were allowed to quit the survey at
any point and they could not change their responses.
After completing the survey, participants were
debriefed and thanked.
Belief in conspiracy theories. Belief in conspiracy
theories was measured using a scale assessing belief in
real-world conspiracy theories including eight items
from Douglas and Sutton (2011) (e.g., “The American
moon landings were faked”; 1 = strongly disagree,
7 = strongly agree, a = .80).1
Causal interpretation of spurious correlations. Causal
interpretation of spurious correlations (CISC) was
measured with a newly developed scale (see Appen-
dix). Participants were presented with six spurious cor-
relations (e.g., “It has been shown that an increase in
people’s income is associated with more visits to the
hospital”; “It has been shown that an increase in the
average global temperature is associated with an
increase in the national science foundation budget”),
and asked to rate how much they agree with the
following explanations of the relation between the
two events: a causal relation, random coincidence, or
a third cause (1 = totally disagree, 9 = totally agree,
acause = .67, arandom = .69, aconfound = .71). Addition-
ally, participants were asked to indicate how hard it
would be to think of a reason why the two events are
causally connected (1 = extremely easy, 9 = extremely
hard, a = .62).
Results
Descriptive statistics and correlations are reported in
Table 1. Of primary interest to the present study, these
shows that that participants were more likely to agree
with conspiracy theories if they also tended to infer
direct causal relations from spurious correlations, r
(195) = .39, p < .001. In addition, conspiracy belief
correlated positively with third cause perceptions, r
(195) = .16, p = .027, and negatively, but only mar-
ginally, with random coincidence perceptions, r
(195) = .14, p = .059.
Most importantly, a linear regression analysis of
causal relation, random coincidence, third cause per-
ceptions, ease, level of education, age and gender in
the same model on conspiracy belief revealed that
only the perception of a direct causal relation predicted
conspiracy belief significantly, B = .29, SE = .06, CI
95% [0.17; 0.41], p < .001 (Table 2).
Discussion
In the present study, perceptions of direct causal rela-
tionships between spuriously correlated variables were
associated with conspiracy thinking. Previous research
has shown that conspiracy thinking is associated with
the perception of causal connections between random
events, between which, by definition, no causal rela-
tionships exist (van Prooijen et al., 2018). The present
results confirm that perception of implausible causal
relationships between events may underpin conspir-
acy thinking, and extend this finding to cases in which
events are not random, but conform to an objective
pattern. Importantly, perceptions that the spurious
correlations were explained either by coincidence or
by the operations of a third cause were not uniquely
associated with conspiracy thinking. Thus, the critical
predictor of conspiracy thinking was not the inference
of causality (vs. randomness) per se, but the specific,
implausible inference that a direct causal connection
linked the two focal events. In the next study, we
sought to extend these findings further by including
measures that address the perception of implausible
causal relations (magical ideation) as well as more
general measures of the perception of meaning and
order in random stimuli (visual pattern perception).
Study 2
In Study 2, we aimed to replicate and extend the find-
ings of Study 1 in two distinct ways. First, we included
Whitson and Galinsky’s (2008) measure of visual pat-
tern perception to examine whether it is related to
conspiracy thinking and, once it is adjusted for,
whether causal interpretation of spurious correlations
remains a significant predictor of conspiracy thinking.
The perception of patterns in visual stimuli is thought
to be another manifestation of the motivated percep-
tion of meaning and order in the environment, so we
1We included some additional items (see Appendix for the complete
scale). However, it is important to note that running the same analy-
ses with all items revealed a similar pattern of results.
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wanted to ensure that our predicted effect was related
to but also functioned independently of this mecha-
nism. Second, we included a scale of magical ideation
(Eckblad & Chapman, 1983) in the present study.
Since this scale addresses the tendency for permissive
and unconventional causal thinking, we expected that
it should be related to the causal interpretation of spu-
rious correlations, as well as conspiracy belief. Further,
we included other theoretically relevant control factors
that have also been shown to be associated with con-
spiracy thinking, including rationalistic mind-set
(Swami, Voracek, Stieger, Tran, & Furnham, 2014),
political orientation (Van Prooijen, Krouwel, & Pollet,
2015), religiosity (Beller, 2017; Newheiser et al.,
2011), and education (Douglas et al., 2016; van Prooi-
jen, 2017). As in Study 1, we predicted that causal
interpretations of spurious correlations would be
related to conspiracy belief. Crucially, we also pre-
dicted that it would be related to conspiracy belief
adjusting for magical ideation, and all other variables,
since our theory suggests that imposing a causal inter-
pretation on the environment is a proximal driver of
conspiracy belief.
Method
Participants and design. A sample of 216 partici-
pants (122 men, 91 women, 3 transgendered)
between the ages of 21 and 70 (M = 38.58,
SD = 12.05) were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk (MTurk). Of this sample, 82.9% were White/
Caucasian, 8.3% African American, 4.2% Asian, 3.7%
Hispanic, and .5% Other. Forty-five percent indicated
that they had no religion or were atheist, 43% were
Christian (e.g., Catholic, Protestant), 3% Jewish, 0.5%
Muslim, 2% Buddhist, 0.5% Hindu, and 6% Other
(including ‘spiritual’ and Jehovah’s Witness). The
study had a correlational design. The sample size
allowed us to estimate stable correlation coefficients
(Sch€onbrodt & Perugini, 2013) and provided us with
80% power to detect a correlation of r = .19 with
a = .05 and a two-tailed test.
Materials and procedure. After giving informed
consent, participants were instructed that they would
receive several questionnaires about people’s attitudes
to real-life issues and their causal reasoning.
Belief in conspiracy theories. As in Study 1, conspir-
acy beliefs were measured using five items from the
scale assessing belief in real-world conspiracy theories
(Douglas & Sutton, 2011; a = .81).2
Causal interpretation of spurious correlations. The
same scale as in Study 1 was used to measure CISC
(acause = .61, arandom = .62, aconfound = .70, aease = .64).
Visual pattern perception. A modified version of
Whitson and Galinsky’s measure of pattern perception
was used. Participants received 12 snowy pictures in
random order of which 2 contained a grainy embed-
ded image that was difficult but possible to perceive.
The other 10 pictures were manipulated using soft-
ware to eliminate any traces of the embedded image
(Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). Participants were asked
to identify as quickly and accurately as they can
whether there was an image or not. Since 10 of the 12
pictures were of random static, in which no image
exists, any identification from a participant that they
see an image in the picture is evidence of illusory pat-
tern perception. For our analyses, we used the number
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations for study variables (Study 1)
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Conspiracy belief 2.80 1.11
2. Direct causal relation 3.19 1.43 .39**
3. Random 6.22 1.53 .14† .35**
4. Third cause 4.05 1.57 .16* .30** .03
5. Ease 4.14 1.44 .02 .13† .28** .19*
6. Education 2.87 .60 .06 .08 .07 .23* .12
7. Age 36.32 11.38 .06 .02 .09 .01 .15* .01
8. Gender 1.48 .50 .05 .001 .04 .17* .03 .04 .11
Note: †p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .001 (two-tailed).
Table 2. Regression results for the prediction of conspiracy belief
from direct causal relation, random coincidence, third cause percep-
tion, ease, level of education, age, and gender (Study 1)
Conspiracy belief





Direct causal relation .37**
Random coincidence .02




Note: **p < .001 (two-tailed).
2As in Study 1, it is important to note that running the same analyses
including the additional conspiracy items revealed a similar pattern of
results.
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of times participants perceived an image in the pictures
that lacked an image (see Whitson & Galinsky, 2008).
Magical ideation. To measure magical ideation, we
administered the 10-item magical ideation scale (Eck-
blad & Chapman, 1983). This measure assesses
endorsement of causal mechanisms that are invalid or
metaphysical (e.g., “I have wondered whether the
spirits of the dead can influence the living”,
1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree, a = .85).
Rationalistic versus intuitive mind-set. Participants
completed the Rational-Experiential Inventory,
which is a questionnaire assessing individual differ-
ences in rational and experiential thinking styles
(REI; Pacini & Epstein, 1999; e.g., rationalistic mind-
set; “I prefer complex to simple problems”, 1 = defi-
nitely false, 5 = definitely true, a = .89; and intuitive
mind-set; “I trust my initial feelings about people”,
1 = definitely false, 5 = definitely true, a = .94). For
our analyses, we used separate scores for rational
and experiential thinking styles (with higher scores
indicating higher rational and higher experiential
thinking).
Demographics. Finally, participants were asked to
provide some demographic details. In addition to age,
gender, and ethnicity, participants were asked to rate
their political orientation (e.g., “How would you
describe your political attitudes?”; 1 = very liberal/very
left-wing/strong Democrat, 7 = very conservative/very right-
wing/strong Republican, a = .94). They also rated their
religiosity (Sullivan, 2001) (e.g., “How often do you
attend religious services?”, 1 = not at all, 5 = a great
deal, a = .93), and their level of education (no formal
education, n = 4; primary level education, n = 5; sec-
ondary level education, n = 90; college education
bachelor’s degree, n = 93; college education graduate
degree, n = 24).3
Results
In Table 3, descriptive statistics and correlations are
reported for all study variables. It shows that as pre-
dicted, the belief that a direct causal relation held
between spurious correlates again was positively
related to conspiracy belief, r(216) = .31, p < .001.
Third cause perception, r(216) = .23, p < .001, and
visual pattern perception, r(216) = .17, p = .012, also
correlated significantly with conspiracy belief. More-
over, aside from the non-significant correlation with
political orientation, all other distal variables (i.e.,
magical ideation, non-analytic thinking, religiosity,
education) correlated significantly, and in the pre-














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3Study 2 was part of a larger data collection in which also a measure
of scientific literacy, climate change beliefs and conspiracy theories
was added.
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replicating previous findings (e.g., Douglas et al.,
2016; Lobato et al., 2014). CISC correlated positively
with visual pattern perception, r(216) = .19, p = .006,
and magical ideation, r(216) = .28, p < .001. Causal
relation was unrelated to non-analytic thinking, politi-
cal orientation, religiosity, education, age, or gender.
Notably, a linear regression of conspiracy belief on
causal relation, random coincidence, third cause per-
ception, ease, visual pattern perception, magical idea-
tion, rationalistic and experiential thinking, political
orientation, religiosity, level of education, age, and
gender in the same model revealed that causal relation
significantly predicted conspiracy belief, B = .14,
SE = .06, CI 95% [0.02; 0.26], p = .025, although this
time, magical ideation, B = .92, SE = .10, CI 95%
[0.72; 1.12], p < .001, and education level, B = .31,
SE = .08, CI 95% [0.15; 0.47], p < .001, were also
significant predictors. Crucially, causal relation pre-
dicted conspiracy belief, even when adjusting for all
third variables (Table 4).
Discussion
The present findings replicate and extend the results
of Study 1. First, they show that, as predicted, causal
interpretations of spurious correlations were related to
conspiracy belief. Second, they indicate that this factor
is related to magical ideation, which is an index of
permissive and unconventional causal thinking (Eck-
blad & Chapman, 1983), as well as visual pattern per-
ception, which is an index of the motivated
perception of order and meaning in the environment
(Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). Third, they indicate that
the perception of direct causal relations between spu-
rious correlates, nonetheless, predicts conspiracy
thinking over and above these other variables, as well
as other factors previously shown to be relevant to
conspiracy thinking, including rationalistic or experi-
ential thinking, political orientation, religiosity, and
education. These findings, together, provide further
evidence that implausible causal interpretations even
of non-random events are uniquely related to conspir-
acy thinking.
Study 3
We began this article with a real-life example of
conspiracy thinking in which a streak of cancer diag-
noses among leftist Latin American leaders triggered
one of them, Hugo Chavez, to wonder if the US gov-
ernment may have conspired against them. In this
case, the implausible perception of causal connec-
tions between events led to conspiracy thinking
about the same events. In contrast, Studies 1 and 2
showed that conspiracy beliefs about some events
(e.g., the death of Princess Diana) were associated
with implausible causal interpretations of other
events (e.g., the co-occurrence of chocolate con-
sumption and Nobel Prizes).
In Study 3, we return the focus to cases like the
one that concerned Chavez. We therefore measured
co-occurrence perception, causal interpretation, and
conspiracy belief within a single context. Each partici-
pant was presented with one scenario describing a
streak of human tragedies (either the deaths of three
or four journalists, or the poisoning of three or four
local politicians). Streaks in events, even when they
occur by chance, often trigger implausible causal per-
ceptions such as gambler’s belief in a “hot hand”
(Braga et al., 2016; Caruso et al., 2010). Conspiracy
explanations for the most recent of these tragedies
were measured, and participants were also asked
whether the events are causally connected. We pre-
dicted that perceiving the events as causally con-
nected would be related to conspiracy explanations.
We also measured the extent to which participants
perceived the events to comprise a pattern-like co-
occurrence, and to which they explicitly acknowl-
edged a pattern-like sequence but denied that it
reflected a causal connection.
Prior to these scenarios, participants read two sce-
narios describing streaks of natural events, and were
similarly asked to indicate whether these events com-
prised a co-occurrence and were causally connected.
This served both to conceal the main focus of the
study, and also to test the hypothesis that perceiving
causal connections between natural events would be
related to perceiving casual connections between
human tragedies, and in turn, a preference for conspir-
acy explanations. Thus, Studies 1 and 2 presented
events that comprised a co-occurrence because they
were correlated, whereas Study 3 presented events
that comprised a co-occurrence insofar as they
occurred as a temporally contiguous cluster (see
Appendix).
Table 4. Regression results for the prediction of conspiracy belief
from causal relation, random coincidence, third cause perception,
ease, visual pattern perception, magical ideation, non-analytic thinking,
political orientation, religiosity, education, age, and gender (Study 2)
Conspiracy belief
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
b b b
Political orientation .08 .07 .06
Religiosity .17* .04 .02
Education .21** .21** .20**
Age .12† .02 .01
Gender .12† .10† .09†
Magical ideation .62** .54**
Rational thinking .01 .01
Experiential thinking .07 .07
Causal relation .14*
Random coincidence .07
Third cause perception .11†
Ease .10
Visual pattern perception .09†
F(202) 4.48* 20.86** 15.19**
ΔR2 .08 .43 .46
Note: †p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .001 (two-tailed).
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Method
Participants and design. A sample of 214 partici-
pants (105 men, 108 women, 1 transgendered)
between the ages of 20 and 69 (M = 37.08,
SD = 10.85) were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk (MTurk). Of this sample, 79.4% were White/
Caucasian, 7.5% African American, 6.5% Asian, 4.7%
Hispanic, and 1.8% Other. Fifty-one percent indicated
that they had no religion or were atheist, 42.5% were
Christian (e.g., Catholic, Protestant), 0.5% Jewish,
0.9% Muslim, 1.4% Buddhist, 0.5% Hindu, and 3.2%
Other (including ‘spiritual’ and Wiccan). The study
had a correlational design. The sample size allowed us
to estimate stable correlation coefficients (Sch€onbrodt
& Perugini, 2013) and provided us with 80% power to
detect a correlation of r = .19 with a = .05 two-tailed.
Moreover, we had approximately 80% power to detect
a mediation effect with small to medium paths (Fritz &
MacKinnon, 2007).
Materials and procedure. Participants were ran-
domly presented with two non-social scenarios fol-
lowed by one human scenario. The non-social events
involved a streak of natural events (a cluster of three
or four whale strandings, volcanic eruptions, or animal
disease outbreaks). The human tragedy similarly com-
prised part of a recent streak of similar tragedies (the
last in a series of journalists dying suddenly, or of local
politicians being poisoned). Participants were asked to
indicate, in random order, to what extent they per-
ceived an underlying cause to the events (3 items,
including, “There is a causal connection between these
events”, 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree,
a = .91), a co-occurrence (3 items, including “There
seems to be a pattern to these events”, 1 = strongly dis-
agree, 7 = strongly agree, a = .86), or no connection (2
items, e.g., “Any apparent pattern, similarity, or
increased frequency in these events is probably due to
chance”, 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) (see
Appendix, Table 1).
As this instrument has to date not been used before,
we examined its factor structure by testing and com-
paring two factor models. The first model examined
whether the three items measuring causal connection
and the three items measuring co-occurrence all
loaded on the same underlying factor. This model did
not fit the data well, v2(9) = 170.97, p < .001,
CFI = .86, RMSEA = .286, CI 90% [0.249; 0.324],
SRMR = .064. The second model included two factors.
This model showed better fit, v2(8) = 128.08,
p < .001, CFI = .90, RMSEA = .261, CI 90% [0.222;
0.302], SRMR = .059, and fitted the data significantly
better than the single-factor model, Dv2(1) = 42.99,
p < .001. We therefore proceeded with our analyses
using the two-factor structure (in addition to the two
items measuring no connection).
Belief in conspiracy theories. Our measure of con-
spiracy belief was participants’ agreement with
conspiracy explanations for the most recent human
event, which was either a journalist dying suddenly or
a mayor being poisoned (journalist’s death: “A group
of people acted in secret to cause her death” and
“There was a plot to kill her”, 1 = strongly disagree,
9 = strongly agree, M = 4.31, SD = 2.53, a = .92, and
mayor’s illness: “A group of people acted in secret to
poison her” and “There was a plot to poison her”,
1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree, M = 5.33,
SD = 2.50, a = .87). As filler items, participants indi-
cated their agreement with two non-conspiracy expla-
nations (journalist’ death: “Her death was a suicide”
and “She was killed by a sole person acting alone [not
as part of a plot]”, and mayor’s illness: “It was acci-
dent” and “She was poisoned by a sole person acting
alone [not as part of a plot]”).4
Finally, as a check of understanding, participants
were asked what the most recent event was in the
final story they read (1 = the poisoning of a mayor,
2 = the death of a journalist, 3 = neither). A total
number of 6 participants did not correctly identify the
last scenario they read. These participants were
excluded for the analyses.
Results
We first ran a regression analysis in which conspiracy
explanations for the human scenarios were regressed
onto perceived causal connection and perceived co-
occurrence. As predicted, this analysis revealed that
causal connection, B = .66, SE = .10, CI 95% [0.46;
0.86], p < .001, and co-occurrence, B = .29, SE = .11,
CI 95% [0.07; 0.51], p = .010, within the human sce-
narios are strongly and independently related to con-
spiracy explanations (Table 5). However, it should be
noted that although perceptions of causal connection
and co-occurrence comprised separate factors, they
were strongly related to each other.
We proceeded by testing the mediation between
judgments of cause in natural scenarios and conspiracy
belief by judgments of cause in human scenarios.
Using Hayes and Preacher’s (2013) bootstrapping
macro designed for SPSS, we tested the significance of
the indirect effect with 5,000 bootstrap re-samples.
The mediation analysis revealed that there was a sig-
nificant indirect effect of judgments of cause in natural
scenarios through judgments of cause in human sce-
narios on conspiracy belief (with judgments of co-
occurrence in natural and human scenarios added as
covariates) with the 95% bootstrap confidence interval
(CI) excluding zero (ab = 0.25, SE = .08, 95% CI
4Prior to rating their agreement to these items, we asked participants
to explain in their own words what they thought might have
explained the most recent human event. The generated explanations
were judged by four independent raters for the extent to which they
refer to conspiracies (see https://osf.io/m2g4x for coding instructions).
The inter-reliability was high, a = .91. Yet, since only n = 34 partici-
pants spontaneously generated a conspiracy explanation, the num-
bers were too low to distinguish between co-occurrence and cause.
978 European Journal of Social Psychology 48 (2018) 970–989 ª 2018 The Authors. European Journal of Social Psychology Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Suspicious binds R. C. van der Wal et al.
[0.10, 0.43]). Importantly, the indirect effect indicates
that there seems to be a general tendency to see cause
and co-occurrence across social and non-social set-
tings, which in turn affects the tendency to belief in
conspiracy explanations.
Discussion
The present results offer initial evidence that conspiracy
thinking is associated with perceptions that a cluster of
similar events was causally connected. It therefore
builds on Studies 1 and 2 by showing that a preference
for conspiracy explanations is associated with perceived
causal connections within the same domain. Its find-
ings also build on Study 2 by indicating that the ten-
dency to draw causal connections in the human realm
is reflected more generally by a tendency to draw
connections between events in the natural world.
One feature of the present results is that perceptions
that events comprised a pattern and causal percep-
tion of the patterns were separable in a confirmatory
factor analysis, but were highly correlated. This find-
ing lends weight to the suggestion that pattern per-
ception in event sequences depends on the causal
interpretation of those sequences (van Prooijen
et al., 2018). It also suggests the need for further
research to more effectively tease apart the co-occur-
rence of events and the extent to which they are per-
ceived as causally connected. Thus, whereas Study 3
always presents event clusters, in our next and final
study we turn to an experimental design in which
causal interpretation and the co-occurrence of
events are orthogonalized.
Study 4
In Study 4, we experimentally manipulated causal
connection and co-occurrence perception, using
similar scenarios as those in Study 3. The primary
aim of this study was to examine whether conspir-
acy explanations are not only associated with but
are affected by the perception of causal connection.
Another aim of the study was to examine whether
the effect of causal connection on conspiracy belief
is moderated by objective evidence of a co-occur-
rence. According to our theorizing, the implausible
perception of causal connections between events
drives conspiracy theories whether there is no
objective pattern in events (as in van Prooijen et al.,
2018) or whether events conform to some kind of
structure (as in Studies 1 and 2). We therefore
expected that seeing events as causally connected
would predict conspiracy belief whether or not a co-
occurrence was evident in those events.
To test these ideas, we used a 2 (causal vs. no causal
connection) 9 2 (co-occurrence vs. no co-occurrence)
between-subjects design, in which participants were
presented with the same events as in Study 3. In the
manipulation of co-occurrence, each event was
described (co-occurrence condition) as the latest in a
streak of three or four similar recent events (as in
Study 3), or (isolated condition) as a relatively iso-
lated event, with only one local and relatively dis-
tant precedent (e.g., 25 years ago). In the
manipulation of causal perception, participants were
told that the events within each scenario were, or
were not, causally connected. Our measure of con-
spiracy belief was again participants’ agreement with
two potential conspiracy explanations of the (most
recent) human event.
Method
Participants and design. A sample of 211 partici-
pants (120 men, 91 women) between the ages of 18
and 77 (M = 35.94, SD = 11.61) were recruited via
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Of this sample,
69.7% were White/Caucasian, 7.1% African Ameri-
can, 14.2% Asian, 5.7% Hispanic, and 3.3% Other.
Fifty-three percent indicated that they had no religion
or were atheist, 32.7% were Christian (e.g., Catholic,
Protestant), 2.4% Jewish, 0.9% Muslim, 1.9% Bud-
dhist, 0.5% Hindu, and 8.5% Other (including Mor-
mon and ‘spiritual’). The study had a 2 Causality
(causally connected vs. causally unconnected) 9 2
Co-occurrence (isolated vs. co-occurring) between-
subjects design. The sample size provided us with 80%
power to detect an effect of g2p ¼ :04 with a = .05 and
a two-tailed test.
Materials and procedure. In the manipulation of
co-occurrence, each event was described (co-occurring
condition; N = 110) as the latest in a streak of three or
four similar recent events, or (isolated condition;
N = 101) as a relatively isolated event. In the manipu-
lation of causal perception, participants were told that
the events within each scenario were, or were not,
causally connected (causally connected; N = 101, cau-
sally unconnected; N = 110).
Belief in conspiracy theories. Our measure of con-
spiracy belief was again participants’ agreement with
two potential conspiracy explanations of the (most
recent) human event (journalist’ death: “A group of
people acted in secret to cause her death” and “There
was a plot to kill her”, 1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly
agree, M = 4.77, SD = 2.53, and mayor’s illness: “A
group of people acted in secret to poison her” and
Table 5. Regression results for the prediction of conspiracy explana-







Note: *p < .05; **p < .001 (two-tailed).
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“There was a plot to poison her”, 1 = strongly disagree,
9 = strongly agree, M = 4.53, SD = 2.58).5
Manipulation checks. As manipulation checks, we
asked participants to rate the extent they thought the
events within the scenarios seemed to have occurred
(i) unusually close together in time, (ii) more often
than one would normally expect (co-occurrence per-
ception: M = 4.40, SD = 2.03, a = .82), and (iii)
whether they thought the events within them were
causally connected (causal connection: M = 4.26,
SD = 2.57).
Finally, as a check of understanding, participants
were asked what the most recent event was in the
final story they read (1 = the poisoning of a mayor,
2 = the death of a journalist, 3 = neither). A total
number of 11 participants did not correctly identify
the last scenario they read. These participants were
omitted from the dataset.
Results
We first checked whether the co-occurrence condition
affected perceptions of cause, and in a similar way,
whether the cause condition affected perceptions of co-
occurrence. An Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) of cause
condition, co-occurrence condition, and the interaction
between cause and co-occurrence condition on per-
ceived causal connection revealed a significant effect of
cause condition, F(1, 207) = 14.74, p < .001, g2p ¼ :07,
and also a significant effect of co-occurrence condition,
F(1, 207) = 4.28, p = .040, g2p ¼ :02. The interaction
effect between cause and co-occurrence condition was
not significant, p = .426. In addition, an ANOVA of co-
occurrence condition, cause condition, and the interac-
tion between co-occurrence and cause condition on
perceived co-occurrence revealed only a significant
effect of co-occurrence condition, F(1, 207) = 91.10,
p < .001, g2p ¼ :31, but no effect of cause condition,
p = .157, nor an interaction effect between co-occur-
rence and cause condition, p = .586. These analyses
suggest that, indeed, cause and co-occurrence are
orthogonal manipulations, and thus should not be seen
as manipulations of the same construct.
To test our main hypothesis that conspiracy explana-
tions are affected by the perception of causal connec-
tion, over and above co-occurrence perception, we ran
an ANOVA with the two between-subjects manipula-
tions as fixed factors and the tendency to explain
events as conspiracies as dependent variable (Figure 1).
This analysis revealed a main effect of co-occurrence,
F(1, 207) = 7.46, p = .007, g2p ¼ :04, such that events
are more likely to be explained as conspiracies if they
happen in a cluster of similar events (M = 4.93,
SD = 2.32) rather than as relatively isolated (M = 4.11,
SD = 2.28). In addition, we found a main effect of cau-
sal connection, F(1, 207) = 6.66, p = .011, g2p ¼ :03.
That is, events are more likely to be explained as con-
spiracies if they are seen as causally connected
(M = 4.94, SD = 2.16) versus unconnected to other
similar events (M = 4.17, SD = 2.43). We did not find a
significant interaction effect between co-occurrence
perception and causal connection, p = .954. Hence,
these findings underscore our reasoning such that
inferring causal connection affects conspiracy belief,
whether or not there is an underlying co-occurrence.
Discussion
The present study produced three novel and important
effects. First, participants favored conspiracy explana-
tions when they were told that events were causally
connected (vs. causally unconnected). This provides
experimental evidence that conspiracy thinking is pro-
moted by the perception that events are causally con-
nected. Second, participants favored conspiracy
explanations for events that were preceded (vs. not
preceded) by similar events in the recent past. This
finding addresses a largely neglected question—
namely what types of events are most likely to attract
conspiracy thinking (but see Leman & Cinnirella,
2007; for evidence that conspiracy explanations are
more likely for events that are especially socially sig-
nificant). Kovic and F€uchslin (2018) found that con-
spiracy thinking is elicited by highly improbable
events. The present findings are broadly consistent
with that result insofar as the focal event may be seen
as less probable in the context of a rash of similar
events. Third, and most important to our central argu-









Causally connected Causally unconnected
Fig. 1: Mean ratings of conspiracy explanation as a function of co-
occurrence perception (co-occurring vs. isolated) and causal connec-
tion (causally connected vs. causally unconnected; Study 4)
5As in Study 3, we asked participants to explain in their own words
what they thought might have explained the most recent human
event. The generated explanations were judged by two independent
raters for the extent to which they refer to conspiracies (see https://
osf.io/m2g4x for coding instructions). The inter-reliability was
a = .72. Again, only n = 18 participants spontaneously generated a
conspiracy explanation. These numbers were too low to distinguish
between pattern and cause.
980 European Journal of Social Psychology 48 (2018) 970–989 ª 2018 The Authors. European Journal of Social Psychology Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Suspicious binds R. C. van der Wal et al.
other: Seeing events as causally connected increased
conspiracy theory irrespective of whether events co-
occurred or were relatively isolated. This suggests that
conspiracy theories are a manifestation of a desire to
impose a causal interpretation on events, whether or
not those events comprise an objective co-occurrence.
General Discussion
Previous research and theory has suggested that con-
spiracy thinking is determined by the desire to impose
meaning and order on the world, and so should be
related to the perception of patterns in the environ-
ment (Newheiser et al., 2011; Whitson & Galinsky,
2008). More recently, researchers have investigated
the more specific relation between conspiracy thinking
and perceptions of causal connections between events
(Dieguez et al., 2015; van Prooijen et al., 2018). The
primary focus of this theory and research has been on
illusory pattern perception in the case of random event
sequences in which no objective pattern is present. By
definition, no causal connections exist between ran-
dom events, meaning that perceptions of pattern in
such events depend on implausible causal inferences
—an erroneous process of “connecting the dots” (van
Prooijen et al., 2018) among dots that are necessarily
unconnected. However, conspiracy theories generally
do not attempt to explain genuinely random events.
Rather, they explain events for which there is a multi-
tude of causes, but where observers rely on second-
hand, ambiguous, or contested causal information
(Douglas & Sutton, 2011).
We therefore attempted to build on previous
research by examining whether conspiracy thinking is
informed by implausible causal inferences even when
events have some objective causal structure. In Studies
1 and 2, this structure took the form of a spurious cor-
relation between events, for which some causal infer-
ences are warranted, but not the specific, critical
inference that a direct causal connection exists
between the two focal events. Confirming predictions,
conspiracy thinking was related to this specific causal
inference, and not to the perception that the correla-
tion was a coincidence or attributable to a third cause.
In Studies 3 and 4, it took the form of temporal conti-
guity, such that the target event occurred as part of a
streak of similar events (vs. in isolation). Confirming
predictions, whether measured (Study 3) or manipu-
lated (Study 4), the inference that these events were
causally connected was shown to inform conspiracy
explanations for the most recent event in the
sequence.
The present research therefore indicates that con-
spiracy thinking is driven by a general permissiveness
in causal inference—specifically, the willingness to
perceive causal connections where none are likely.
This tendency is well-established in research on cau-
sal inference, where it has been dubbed “the illusion
of causality” (Blanco & Matute, 2018, p. 45), and
contributes to pseudoscientific beliefs (Blanco &
Matute, 2018), the rejection of science (Rutjens,
Heine, Sutton, & van Harreveld, 2018), and belief
that misfortunes are cosmic punishments for objec-
tively unrelated wrongdoings (Callan et al., 2014). It
is responsible for the perception of pattern in random
event sequences (van Prooijen et al., 2018), and as
the present studies indicate, for causal inferences
linking events that comprise part of some objective
pattern but which are not causally related to each
other.
Permissive and unconventional causal thinking is
captured by the individual difference variable magical
ideation (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983), which has
been shown to be related to conspiracy thinking
(Darwin et al., 2011; Douglas et al., 2016; Lobato
et al., 2014). In Study 2, we found this variable to be
related not only to conspiracy thinking but to the
perception of direct causal relations between spurious
correlates. Our findings suggest that magical and con-
spiracy beliefs are linked not only because each is (in
general) “epistemically unwarranted” (Lobato et al.,
2014, p.617), but because each reflects a common
psychological process, namely the imposition of phys-
ically implausible causal interpretations on co-occur-
rences.
Relation to Previous Studies of Pattern
Perception and Conspiracy Belief
The present studies converge with other evidence to
suggest that conspiracy belief is associated with the
motivated perception of meaning and order in the
environment. Whitson and Galinsky (2008) found
that both conspiracy thinking and the perception of
pattern in noisy visual arrays were affected by a
manipulation of powerlessness, but did not report the
correlation between the two. In Study 2, we observed
a statistically significant correlation between conspir-
acy beliefs and visual pattern perception. We also
found that the relation between conspiracy belief and
implausible causal inferences linking spurious corre-
lates was significant even adjusting for visual pattern
perception. This finding suggests that conspiracy
beliefs are informed more specifically by implausible
causal inferences. As we have seen, this conclusion
resonates strongly with the conclusions of van Prooi-
jen et al. (2018) who showed that such causal infer-
ences, in the context of random stimuli, were
associated with and causative of conspiracy thinking.
Although largely consistent with the findings and
conclusions of van Prooijen et al. (2018), our results
diverge from one of their results in a subtle but impor-
tant way. Most important, van Prooijen et al. (2018)
report one finding that suggests that pattern percep-
tion may be associated with conspiracy thinking only
when stimuli are unstructured. Specifically, in their
Study 3, they found that only perceptions of pattern in
unstructured paintings (by Pollock) were associated
with conspiracy belief, whereas perceiving pattern in
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structured paintings (by Vasarely) were not.6 We sug-
gest that this might be due to a key methodological
difference. The critical tasks in the present studies
involved judgments about event sequences, rather
than visual stimuli such as paintings. The difference is
not just superficial, but may be conceptually impor-
tant. For example, the perception of patterns in visual
stimuli such as paintings and Whitson and Galinsky’s
(2008) snowy images may not depend on causal infer-
ences but rather gestalt perceptual processes. Indeed,
magical ideation (in Study 2; see Table 3) was unre-
lated to visual pattern perception. Further, since paint-
ings (unlike most event sequences in everyday life)
are deliberately created by artists, there is always an
unambiguous causal attribution for a clearly apparent
structure: That is, it was put there by the artist. This
means that (at least) when paintings are clearly struc-
tured, the perception of pattern in clearly structured
paintings might be decoupled from the causal reason-
ing processes that underpin conspiracy belief.
Further, while the present results affirm others that
have also found a relationship between conspiracy
belief and perceptions of pattern and non-randomness
(van Prooijen et al., 2018; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008),
they are at odds with results reported by Dieguez et al.
(2015), which found no such relationship. One poten-
tial explanation might appeal to the social and ecologi-
cal meaningfulness of the stimuli. Pattern perception
appears to be relevant to conspiracy thinking when
the stimuli are (or could be) meaningful in everyday
life, as is the case with pictures that represent objects
or convey ideas and emotions, and coin tosses, which
are typically performed when something is at stake. In
contrast, Dieguez et al. (2015) presented sequences of
Xs and Os, and did not describe to participants what
they represented, or what was at stake in these
sequences. If stimuli do not have a clear apparent or
potential social meaning, they may not activate the
sense-making motivations that are thought to under-
pin conspiracy theories (Douglas, Sutton, & Cichocka,
2017). Another important feature of some of their
conditions is that a potential cause for any order was
introduced (i.e., a cheat who was influencing the out-
come). This may have stripped the task of some of the
critical causal ambiguity that seems to be needed for
the thought processes that are characteristic of conspir-
acy thinking to be detectable. A final point is that Die-
guez et al.’s measure of beliefs about randomness
versus determination was rigorous and sophisticated,
but it is not known how it relates to the measures used
in our studies, nor those by Whitson and Galinsky
(2008) and van Prooijen et al. (2018).
Limitations and Future Directions
Our studies have some important limitations. They
relied on online MTurk samples and did not incorpo-
rate actual events that may have happened in the (re-
cent) past. Future research should examine a broader,
more representative range of participants and stimulus
events. Further, the present studies were not always
successful in cleanly distinguishing the causal interpre-
tation of event sequences from the perception of
apparent patterns in those sequences. For reasons we
have noted, including the covariation principle in cau-
sal reasoning, we can expect perceptions of co-
occurrence and causal inferences to be related under
normal circumstances. Future studies could go further
in developing tasks that cleanly separate the two pro-
cesses. For example, in pictorial stimuli, it could be
useful to ask participants not only whether they see a
pattern (van Prooijen et al., in press, Study 3) or an
object (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008) in a visual array,
but whether they think the pattern could have
emerged by chance or whether it must have been
determined.
Future research could also determine whether a ten-
dency to interpret event sequences in causal terms
mediates several of the effects in the conspiracy theory
literature, and so offers an organizing theoretical
framework for them. For example, thwarting needs to
belong (Graeupner & Coman, 2017) and to achieve
cognitive closure (Marchlewska et al., 2017), and acti-
vating powerlessness (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008) have
been shown to increase conspiracy thinking. They are
also likely to result in heightened readiness to draw
causal connections between events in an effort to
impose meaning on experience. The conjunction fal-
lacy—the tendency to see explanations with two pre-
mises as more plausible than those with one—has also
been linked both to conspiracy theory (Brotherton &
French, 2014) and to the perception of underlying
causal mechanisms (Ahn & Bailenson, 1996).
Concluding Remarks
Since the earliest research on conspiracy theories,
scholars have seen conspiracy belief as an attempt to
find order in the environment. The present results are
consistent with this perspective, but show that
whether or not co-occurrences exist (and are per-
ceived to exist), conspiracy thinking is fueled by
implausible causal interpretations of those events:
specifically, the perception of direct causal connections
between events that are unlikely to be so connected.
Thus, Hugo Chavez’s conspiracy thinking was fueled
by the fact that not just one, but several, Latin Ameri-
can leaders were stricken by cancer in the early years
6Although we conducted the present studies before we were aware of
the studies by van Prooijen et al. (2018) and therefore did not seek to
replicate them, Study 2 also used pictorial stimuli—namely a selec-
tion of visual arrays presented by Whitson and Galinsky (2008), two
of which were ordered (represented objects), and 10 of which were
random. Exploratory analysis conceptually replicated the results of
van Prooijen et al. (2018: Study 3). Namely, conspiracy thinking was
positively associated with perception that there was a picture in the
disordered stimuli, r(216) = .17, p = .012, but negatively associated
with the perception that there was a picture in the orderly stimuli, r
(216) = .16, p = .016.
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of this decade—consistent with the novel finding, in
our final study, that events are more likely to be
explained as conspiracies if they are part of a series of
similar events, rather than one-offs. Crucially, Cha-
vez’s conspiracy thinking was also fueled by his view
that this co-occurrence in events reflected a causal
connection between them.
The philosopher Mackie (1980) termed causality the
“cement of the universe.” By this, Mackie meant that
causality is a force, real or imagined, that links events
together in people’s minds, and enables people to
understand and respond to relations between events.
The rash of cancer diagnoses afflicting several Latin
American leaders in the early years of this decade is
most plausibly seen as a tragic coincidence, and
cementing them together as Chavez did appears to be
illegitimate. Nonetheless, each diagnosis should not
necessarily be seen as an entirely random event: It
could also be seen as the product of a confluence of
genetic, environmental and lifestyle factors. More gen-
erally, the events that conspiracy theories typically
seek to explain are not entirely random or unrelated
to other events. Natural disasters, diseases, personal
deaths and tragedies, election results, and socio-politi-
cal circumstances do not occur in a causal vacuum but
are enmeshed in a complicated matrix of causes.
Nonetheless, even though conspiracy thinking takes
place in contexts where events are seldom entirely
random, it appears to be characterized by a willingness
to draw imaginary causal connections between events.
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Appendix
Conspiracy Belief (Study 1)
Please indicate how much you agree with each state-
ment by selecting the appropriate response in each
case (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree):
1. The Federal Reserve System is designed to transfer
wealth from the poor and middle classes of the Uni-
ted States to a group of unknown international
elites.
2. Forced transition to digital television broadcasting is
intended to facilitate subliminal advertising.
3. Media outlets try to hide some government actions,
claiming those military operations are actually ter-
rorist actions.
4. A group of international elites controls and manip-
ulates governments, industry, and media organiza-
tions worldwide.
5. Some chronic diseases could be treated using medi-
cal and pharmaceutical developments that are
obscured by the pharmaceutical industry interests.
6. Pope Benedict XVI resigned because he himself was
part of the Roman Catholic sex abuse scandals.
Items from Douglas and Sutton (2011):
7. There was no conspiracy involved in the assassina-
tion of John. F. Kennedy.
8. Princess Diana’s death was an accident.
9. The AIDS virus was created in a laboratory.
10. The attack on the Twin Towers was not a terrorist
action but a governmental conspiracy.
11. The American moon landings were faked.
12. Princess Diana had to be killed because the British
government could not accept that the mother of
the future king was involved with a Muslim Arab.
13. Efficient alternative energy sources were devel-
oped but kept into obscurity by petroleum
companies.
14. Governments are suppressing evidence of the
existence of aliens.
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Conspiracy Belief (Study 2)
Please indicate how much you agree with each state-
ment by selecting the appropriate response in each
case (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree):
1. Lee Harvey Oswald collaborated with the CIA in
assassinating President John F. Kennedy.
2. A small, secret group of people is responsible for
making all major world decisions, such as going to
war.
3. Technology with mind-control capacities is used on
people without their knowledge.
Items from Douglas and Sutton (2011):
4. Governments are suppressing evidence of the exis-
tence of aliens.
5. The American moon landings were faked.
6. The AIDS virus was created in a laboratory.
7. The attack on the Twin Towers was not a terrorist
action but a governmental conspiracy.
8. There was an official campaign by MI6 to assassi-
nate Princess Diana, sanctioned by elements of the
establishment.
Causal Interpretation of Spurious Correlations
(CISC: Study 1 and Study 2)
Often different variables are strongly correlated,
although the reasons for this relation are not under-
stood. You will now be asked to think about how dif-
ferent variables or events relate to each other. This is,
you will have to think about the relation between
events that were demonstrated to be highly correlated:
1. It has been shown that an increase in the number
of storks is associated with an increase in the num-
ber of children.
2. It has been shown that an increase in people’s
income is associated with more visits to the hospital.
3. It has been shown that an increase in body lice is
associated with an increase in health.
4. It has been shown that an increase in chocolate
consumption is associated with an increase in
Nobel prize winners in a country.
5. It has been shown that an increase in the amount
of US spending on science, space and technology is
associated with an increase in suicides by hanging,
strangulation and suffocation.
6. It has been shown that an increase in the average
global temperature is associated with an increase in
the national science foundation budget.
For each of the six combinations, please rate how
much you agree with the following possible explana-
tions of the relation between the two events
(1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree):
1. This is a causal relation. One event caused (directly
or indirectly) the other.
2. This relation is a random coincidence.
3. This relation is explained by a third variable that
affects the prevalence of both events.
Natural and Human Scenarios (Study 3)
Whale stranding (natural)
Most recent event. A pod of over 200 pilot whales
stranded on a remote beach in the North Island of
New Zealand. Despite the efforts of hundreds of volun-
teers, the majority of the whales tragically died.
Previous events.
• In the past three years, there have been four such
incidents of whale strandings in the area.
• In the first such incident, a pod of 15 sperm whales
were stranded on the same beach and locals were
able to rescue almost all but two of them.
• In next incident, some fifteen months later, a pod of
over 150 pilot whales beached themselves in a bay
only 10 km to the south.
• About a year after that, a pod of about 60 pilot
whales were beached on the next bay to the north.
About half of them were rescued by volunteers.
Volcano eruption (natural)
Most recent event. A volcano in the Philippines
that was thought to be dormant suddenly erupted,
causing a pyroclastic (mud and ash flow) that demol-
ished a small village, killing 47 people.
Previous events.
• In the past two years, three other volcanoes in the
region have erupted unexpectedly.
• One such eruption, 50 km to the southeast, obliter-
ated a small, uninhabited island and caused ash
deposits of up to 20 cm to fall on neighboring islands.
• Another eruption lasted several days and caused the
formation of a new island a further 100 km to the
east.
• The first of these eruptions killed 105 people in an
island to the north, and created a peninsula that
extended the island a further 750 m into the sea
Swine flu (natural)
Most recent event. In a southern province of
China, a new strain of swine flu erupted was identified
at a local farm. Thousands of pigs were culled and
strict quarantine measures were imposed.
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Previous events.
• In the past two years, there here have been three
similar outbreaks of new strains of the virus in the
same province.
• One was caught early when an alert inspector at an
agricultural market noticed flu-like symptoms in
some sows as they arrived to be sold. They were
immediately isolated and only the on local farm
needed to be quarantined.
• Another was much more disastrous. A new strain
emerged at a mixed poultry and pig farm and
rapidly spread to neighboring farms, resulting in the
immediate shutdown of agricultural production in
the province, and culling on a scale that has not
been officially disclosed.
• Shortly before the most recent case, a new strain
emerged in a remote village, and there were initial
reports that the virus had crossed the species barrier
to infect several villagers. However, the outbreak
was contained effectively and tests confirmed that
the humans were infected with a normal strain of
human influenza.
Journalist’ death (human)
Most recent event. A journalist investigating local
political affairs was found dead in her apartment with
a suicide note and an open bottle of pills.
Previous events.
• In the past eighteen months, three other journalists
in the same city have died suddenly.
• One of them was struck and killed outside her home
in a hit-and-run after returning home from covering
a late-night council meeting. The driver was never
found.
• Another was discovered dead at the bottom of a cliff
after an extensive missing persons search, having
apparently committed suicide.
• A fourth journalist was shot and killed in a local
backstreet after an apparent botched robbery.
Mayor’s sudden illness (human)
Most recent event. The mayor of a large city was
severely disfigured and largely blind after suffering an
apparent toxic reaction after a dinner function. Doctors
were unable to identify the toxin. She remains in hospi-
tal, and is not expected to recover her sight, and is reliant
on dialysis until a kidney transplant can be arranged.
Previous events.
• She was the third politician in the region to have
become very ill as a result of a toxic reaction in the
last year.
• Some two months previously, the elected official
responsible for the city’s finances abruptly lost con-
sciousness during a council meeting. Although no
lasting damage appears to have been done to his
health, he was in hospital for approximately
two weeks with severe drowsiness, vomiting, and a
rash. Doctors were unable to find a cause for the
symptoms and attributed them to a reaction to an
unknown poison.
• Around six months before that, the official responsi-
ble for planning and developments fell ill while visit-
ing business interests in the surrounding countryside,
experiencing anaphylaxis and temporary organ fail-
ure. The official is on long-term leave until he is well
enough to return to work.
Please rate how much you agree with the following
statements about the events described (1 = strongly dis-
agree, 9 = strongly agree):
1. There is a causal connection between these events.
2. These events have a common underlying cause.
3. These events are causally connected.
4. There seems to be a pattern to these events.
5. These events seem to comprise a group or cluster.
6. These events appear to have occurred closer
together in time than one would normally expect.
7. Any apparent pattern, similarity or increased fre-
quency in these events is a coincidence.
8. Any apparent pattern, similarity, or increased fre-
quency in these events is probably due to chance.
9. In your own words, please explain what you think
might have caused the most recent event (i.e., the
journalist investigating local political affairs being
found dead in her apartment with a suicide note and
an open bottle of pills/the mayor’s sudden illness)?
What do you think caused the most recent event
(i.e., the journalist investigating local political affairs
being found dead in her apartment with a suicide note
and an open bottle of pills/the mayor’s sudden ill-
ness)? 1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree
1. Her death was a suicide/It was an accident.
2. She was killed/poisoned by a sole person acting
alone (not as part of a plot).
3. A group of people acted in secret to cause her
death/poison her.—conspiracy explanation
4. There was a plot to kill her/poison her.—conspiracy
explanation
Natural and Human Scenarios (Study 4)
Whale stranding (natural)
Please read about these events and answer the ques-
tions below. Note that there is a causal connection (vs.
no causal connection) between these events.
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Most recent event. A pod of over 200 pilot
whales stranded on a remote beach in the North
Island of New Zealand. Despite the efforts of hundreds
of volunteers, the majority of the whales tragically
died.
Previous events (cluster).
• In the past three years, there have been four such
incidents of whale strandings in the area.
• In the first such incident, a pod of 15 sperm whales
were stranded on the same beach and locals were
able to rescue almost all but two of them.
• In next incident, some fifteen months later, a pod of
over 150 pilot whales beached themselves in a bay
only 10 km to the south.
• About a year after that, a pod of about 60 pilot
whales were beached on the next bay to the north.
About half of them were rescued by volunteers.
Previous event (no cluster).
• There has been one other such incident in the area.
In 1985, a pod of about 60 pilot whales were bea-
ched on the next bay to the north. About half of
them were rescued by volunteers.
Volcano eruption (natural)
Please read about these events and answer the ques-
tions below. Note that there is a causal connection (vs.
no causal connection) between these events.
Most recent event. A volcano in the Philippines
that was thought to be dormant suddenly erupted,
causing a pyroclastic (mud and ash flow) that demol-
ished a small village, killing 47 people.
Previous events (cluster).
• In the past two years, three other volcanoes in the
region have erupted unexpectedly.
• One such eruption, 50 km to the southeast, obliter-
ated a small, uninhabited island and caused ash
deposits of up to 20 cm to fall on neighboring
islands.
• Another eruption lasted several days and caused the
formation of a new island a further 100 km to the
east.
• The first of these eruptions killed 105 people in an
island to the north, and created a peninsula that
extended the island a further 750 m into the sea.
Previous event (no cluster).
• There has been one other unexpected eruption in
the region. In the 1920s, an eruption killed 105
people in an island to the north, and created a
peninsula that extended the island a further 750 m
into the sea.
Swine flu (natural)
Please read about these events and answer the ques-
tions below. Note that there is a causal connection (vs.
no causal connection) between these events.
Most recent event. In a southern province of
China, a new strain of swine flu was identified at a
local farm. Thousands of pigs were culled and strict
quarantine measures were imposed.
Previous events (cluster).
• In the past two years, there here have been three
similar outbreaks of new strains of the virus in the
same province.
• One was caught early when an alert inspector at an
agricultural market noticed flu-like symptoms in
some sows as they arrived to be sold. They were
immediately isolated and only the on local farm
needed to be quarantined.
• Another was much more disastrous. A new strain
emerged at a mixed poultry and pig farm and
rapidly spread to neighboring farms, resulting in the
immediate shutdown of agricultural production in
the province, and culling on a scale that has not
been officially disclosed.
• Shortly before the most recent case, a new strain
emerged in a remote village, and there were initial
reports that the virus had crossed the species barrier
to infect several villagers. However, the outbreak
was contained effectively and tests confirmed that
the humans were infected with a normal strain of
human influenza.
Previous event (no cluster).
• There has been one similar outbreak of a new strain
of swine flu in the same province.
• Some decades ago, a new strain emerged in a
remote village, and there were initial reports that
the virus had crossed the species barrier to infect
several villagers. However, the outbreak was con-
tained effectively and tests confirmed that the
humans were infected with a normal strain of
human influenza.
Journalist’s death (human)
Please read about these events and answer the
questions below. Note that there is a causal con-
nection (vs. no causal connection) between these
events.
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Most recent event. A journalist investigating local
political affairs was found dead in her apartment with
a suicide note and an open bottle of pills.
Previous events (cluster).
• In the past eighteen months, three other journalists
in the same city have died suddenly.
• One of them was struck and killed outside her home
in a hit-and-run after returning home from covering
a late-night council meeting. The driver was never
found.
• Another was discovered dead at bottom of a cliff
after an extensive missing persons search, having
apparently committed suicide.
• A fourth journalist was shot and killed in a local
backstreet after an apparent botched robbery.
Previous event (no cluster).
• One other journalist has died suddenly in the city.
• Approximately 40 years ago, a journalist was shot
and killed in a local backstreet after an apparent
botched robbery.
Mayor’s sudden illness (human)
Please read about these events and answer the ques-
tions below. Note that there is a causal connection (vs.
no causal connection) between these events.
Most recent event. The mayor of a large city was
severely disfigured and largely blind after suffering an
apparent toxic reaction after a dinner function. Doc-
tors were unable to identify the toxin. She remains in
hospital, and is not expected to recover her sight, and
is reliant on dialysis until a kidney transplant can be
arranged.
Previous events (cluster).
• She was the third politician in the region to have
become very ill as a result of a toxic reaction in the
last year.
• Some two months previously, the elected official
responsible for the city’s finances abruptly lost con-
sciousness during a council meeting. Although no
lasting damage appears to have been done to his
health, he was in hospital for approximately
two weeks with severe drowsiness, vomiting, and a
rash. Doctors were unable to find a cause for the
symptoms and attributed them to a reaction to an
unknown poison.
• Around six months before that, the official responsi-
ble for planning and developments fell ill while visit-
ing business interests in the surrounding
countryside, experiencing anaphylaxis and tempo-
rary organ failure. The official is on long-term leave
until he is well enough to return to work.
Previous event (no cluster).
• One other politician in the region had previous
become very ill as a result of a toxic reaction
• About 25 years ago, the official responsible for plan-
ning and developments fell ill while visiting business
interests in the surrounding countryside, experienc-
ing anaphylaxis and temporary organ failure. The
official remained on long-term leave until he was
well enough to return to work.
Please rate how much you agree with the following
statements about the events described (1 = strongly dis-
agree, 9 = strongly agree):
1. There is a causal connection between these events.
2. These events have a common underlying cause.
3. These events are causally connected.
4. There seems to be a pattern to these events.
5. These events seem to comprise a group or cluster.
6. These events appear to have occurred closer
together in time than one would normally expect.
7. Any apparent pattern, similarity, or increased fre-
quency in these events is a coincidence.
8. Any apparent pattern, similarity, or increased fre-
quency in these events is probably due to chance.
9. In your own words, please explain what you think
might have caused the most recent event (i.e., the
journalist investigating local political affairs being
found dead in her apartment with a suicide note
and an open bottle of pills/the mayor’s sudden
illness).
What do you think caused the most recent event
(i.e., the journalist investigating local political affairs
being found dead in her apartment with a suicide note
and an open bottle of pills/the mayor’s sudden
illness)? 1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree
1. Her death was a suicide/It was an accident.
2. She was killed/poisoned by a sole person acting
alone (not as part of a plot).
3. A group of people acted in secret to cause her
death/poison her.—conspiracy explanation
4. There was a plot to kill her/poison her.—conspiracy
explanation
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